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I. Introduction
One of the central events in the history of the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa community,1 according to its members, is the
civil strife of 1940, and especially the riot on Sunday night,
the 21st of July 1940 in the village of Bethanie. People living
in that village today frequently refer to the period as Bethanie*s
"civi 1 war," a term which emphasizes that the dispute was
profoundly inward-looking, local and devisive, as we 11 as viol ent.
Even today, when most of the leading actors in the drama are dead,
the people of Bethanie are quite reluctant to talk openly about
those events.
That the riot took place in Bethanie, rather than in the
outlying Bakwena-ba-Magopa village of Hebron, was probably
puzzling to the local Native Affairs Department officials and the
German Hermansburg Lutheran missionary, Rev. A.H.W. Behrens, most
deeply engaged in the affairs of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa. Officials
of the Native Affairs Department, missionary Behrens and J.0.M.
Mamogale (See Plate 1), the paramount chief of the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa until just a few months before the riot, had
been concerned about a "rebellious faction" at Hebron throughout
the 1930s. There had been several incidents of violence at
Hebron, for example in November 1931. The discontented faction at
Hebron, moreover, expressed their opposition to the chief in a way
that posited a "counter-orthodoxy**2 to the structure of political
1
 1 have avoided using the term "Tribe" which the Native
Affairs Department used to describe the Bakwena-ba-Magopa, and
thus have used the terms "tribal levy" and "tribal land" in
quotation marks. Instead, I have used the term community. The
entire issue of what a "tribe" is, and whether the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa were a "tribe" begs many questions beyond the
scope of this essay. For one argument about the "retribalization1*
of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa, see Graeme Neil Simpson, "Peasants and
Politics in the Western Transvaal, 1920-1940 (M.A. Thesis,
University of the Witwatersrand, 1986).
2
 Here, I would like use the term "orthodoxy" and
"counter-orthodoxy" (or "heterodoxy") in the way that it has been
used in recent literature on the nature of rebellion in late
imperial China. See, Kuhn, Philip, Rebellion and Its Enemies in
Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure,
1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Susan
Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams
Uprising of 1813 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); and
Elizabeth Perry, RebeIs and Revolutionaries in North China,
1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980). These
writers have been looking at the contradictory ways that social
networks whose beliefs threaten the existing order (eight trigram
sects, bandits, etc.) may be completely unthreatening to that
order most of the time, when not in rebellion, while those
professing support for the order (local militias, local officials)
may inadvertently overthrow it.
2 -
P ! a t e I:. Chief J.Q.M. M a m o g a l e
C o u r t e s y Mr. R r a v l a g e Mniatau
T h e p h o t o g r a p h was p r o b a b l y taken a r o u n d the time of
Chief M a m o g a l e ' s i n s t a l l a t i o n as P a r a m o u n t C h i e f , 1906
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and religious life. They called themselves variously MaRebele
(the Rebels) or "anti-royalists,11 as well as the BaMorula, because
their leader, Levi Ntuane, established a kgot1 a or chief's court
under a Morula tree in opposi tion to the kgotla of the "sub-chief"
of Hebron, Abram Mamoga1e, the paramount chief's twin brother.3
Yet Levi Ntuane frankly admitted he was not of royal blood.4 He
also founded a church in opposition to the Hermansburg Lutheran
Miss ion Church, which had assisted the Bakwena-ba-Magopa in the
purchase of its land In the 19th century, and to which almost
every Mokwena in Bethanie, Hebron and Jericho belonged in the
early 1930s.3 Although he had been a powerful elder4 and
evangelist in the Hermansburg Mission Church before he defected,
he admitted he had little education or theological training.7 To
the Native Affairs Department and Rev. Behrens, the most troubling
aspect of the opposition of the BaMorula was that they refused to
pay a "tribal Levy," adopted by the chieftainship for the purpose
of paying off debts incurred in the purchase of "tribal land.Be
Bethanie, by contrast had been relatively peaceful, and
people in Bethanie had expressed relatively little opposition to
the chief. The people of Bethanie and their kinsmen working on
the Rand had provided the bulk of Levy revenues in the late
1930s.• Unable to comprehend the reasons for the violence of
Sunday night, July 21st and the sudden upsurge in opposition
to the chieftaincy after the deposition of J.O.M. Mamogale -- whom
local Native Affairs Department officials had assumed was the
source of confict within the villages -- Rev. Behrens concluded
3
 The loyal faction called themselves the BaTsiela (locusts)
Interview notes, Mr. L.S. Phalatse, Hebron, 21 January 1989.
4
 He said this in testimony in a court case. See Rathibe v.
Mamogale, TPD 5/235, case 2/1926 at 66.
5
 Interview notes, Mr. L.S. Phalatse, Hebron
* Interview Notes, Mr. L.S. More, Kgabalatsane, 21 January
1989.
7
 Application for church site. GNLB 206, file 1697/14/317.
8
 The BaMorula faction had also unsuccessfully sued Chief
Mamogale to prevent the purchase of the farm Elandsfontein, or to
gain a declaration that Mamogale purchased Elandsfontein for the
Jericho section only. Rathibe v. Reid and Mamogale, TPD 5/235,
case 21/1926. The Native Affairs Department officials believed
that the case had been very expensive and had added to the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa "tribal* debt. For a summary of the case, see
Simpson, p. 293 et. seq.
9
 See monthly reports, A.H.W. Behrens to Secretary for
Native Affairs, on the Bakwena-ba-Magopa Tribal Levy, 1938-1940.
NTS 1384, file 44/213 parts 4-5. Hereinafter, Rev. Behrens's
reports on the "tribal levy" will be cited as "Levy Report."
- 4 -
that a section of the Bethanie congregation of the mission church
"have gone mad and out of control".10
Two writers who have treated the riot of 1940 in Bethanie
have stressed its continuity with the opposition to the chief by
the people of Hebron, and have stressed the central role of the
paramount chief, J.O.M. Mamogale, even though he had been deposed
by the Native Affairs Department a few months before the riot. An
ethnologywritten by P.-L. Breutz briefly summarizes the events
leading up to the riot and places the blame squarely on Chief
Mamogale, whose "weakness," and f inancial "mismanagement" -- along
with disruptive influences brought to the village by those who
had lived in the towns -- had caused divisions within the
community, first at Hebron and then at Bethanie.11 A recent
master's thesis by Graeme Simpson,12 similarly sees Mamogale's
role as central, and the strife at Bethanie as the culmination of
(or at least parallel to) the strife at Hebron during the 1930s:
The strife at both Bethanie and Hebron was a form of ideological
struggle against Chief Mamogale's attempts to extend his power, as
well as against the retribalization policies of the Native Affairs
Department, in which Mamogale, as a chief, and an accumulator of
wealth, power and ideological hegenomy, piayed a willing and
active role.ls
A close look at the events leading up to the "civil war" In
Bethanie reveals a immensely complex conflict. Although the
people who rebelled during July of 1940 were indeed resisting
something, they can hardly be characteri sed as having attempted to
overthrow an oppressive ideological hegenomy. Unlike the BaMorula
secessionists at Hebron* they were profoundly "orthodox.n They
were responding to what appeared to be an attack on several deeply
he Id norms! Christian piety, loyalty to the British Crown, and the
legitimacy of Chief Mamogale's lineage. The counter-orthodox
opposition of the BaMorula failed to spread beyond certain social
networks and boundaries (until after the "orthodox" Bethanie
riot), and neither forced an end to the Levy nor challenged the
church. The "orthodox" riot at Bethanie, however, permanently
ended the Levy and permanently split the Christian community.
The riot in Bethanie is therefore a cautionary tale: In
searching the historical records for people and phenomena which
conform too closely to static notions of "class actors" (or even
"proto" "class actors"), "resistance" and "chiefly power," we run
the risk of draining historical explanations of contradiction and
10
 Levy Report for July 1940, 12 August 1940, NTS 1384, file
44/213, part 5.
11
 P.-L. Breutz, The Tribes of Rustenburg and Pilansberg
Districts (Pretoria: Department of Native Affairs, Ethnological
Pulbication No. 28, 1953), p. 93-94. :
12
 Graem Neil Simpson, Peasants and Politics in the Western
Transvaal, 1920-1940 (M.A. Thesis, University of the
Witwatersrand, 1986), p. 334-335.
13
 Ibid.
- 5 -
ambiguity -- a mistake quite analogous to that of the Indonesian
folk character "Stupid Boy," who, on being told by his mother to
go and seek a quite wife, went out and returned with a corpse.14
II. Freehold Areas, Debt and Conflicts over Land
At the time of the riot, the Bakwena-ba-Magopa were settled
around five villages in the Western Transvaal: Bethanie, the seat
of the paramount chief, is about 20 km. northwest of Brits;
Jericho is about 33 km. due north of Brits; Hebron, currently
being squeezed between the sprawls of Mabopane and Garankua, is
about 25 km. east north east of Brits, and is the closest to
Pretoria; 01ievenpoort, removed in the 1940s, was in the
Waterberg? and Zwartrand, also known as Ga-Magopa, removed
in 1984, was near Ventersdorp. Both Bethanie and Hebron have
satellite villages. About 9 km. south of Bethanie lies Mokolokoe
and a similar distance to the west lies Berseba. Kgabalatsane
village, on the farm Cyferfontein, lies about 5 km east of Hebron
(See map 1).
These Bakwena-ba-Magopa vi1lages 1ie in an unusual section
of the Transvaal. In the 1930s, in the area embracing the
Rustenburg District, the western part of the Pretoria District and
southern part of the Hamanskraal District, there were more African
communities living on freehold farms and locations than in all of
the rest of the districts of the Transvaal combined. Most of
these communi ties had purchased farms during the last quarter of
the 19th century, with the assistance of missionaries. Under the
laws of the South African Republic, Africans could not acquire
title to land, but chiefs were able to acquire the beneficial
ownership of farms registered in the names of missionaries and
missions societies. The Hermansburg Mission Society had been
particularly active in the Rustenburg District, and was the
formal title holder of Bakwena-owned farms at Bethanie, Hebron and
Jer icho.
The Bakwena villages evolved internal structures and
conflicts that were unique to freehold areas. At the same time,
there was also immense variation between the experiences of
various freehold villages within the Bakwena-ba-Magopa community.
For example, by the 1930s, relationships with respect to land
between chiefs and family heads had diverged somewhat from Tswana
communi ties living on non-freehold reserves and in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate. Chiefs* allocations with respect to
land became more fixed, as the community was tied to farms, and
the chiefs became somewhat less important within the overall
pattern of land use and land tenure. Mr. L.S. Phalatse of Hebron
and Mr. M. Mogotsi of Bethanie recall that chiefs allocated
between 3 and 5 morgen of land to a man when he married, and that
once the allocation was made, the land belonged to the individual
forever and would be passed to his heirs on his death. A person
could not acquire more than one allotment or a larger allotment
14
 See Clifford Gertz, Interpretations of Culture, for both
the story and its analogy to over-determined social analysis.
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If, for example, he had a large number of children.ta Although
analogous a 1 locations of land were quite permanent in Bechuanaland
at the time, chiefs there had stronger custodial rights over
land, and in more circumstances land might revert to the chief.'4
This increasingly fixed form of tenure was rooted in the
fixed and limited amount of land communi ties were able to acquire
through purchase and had its parallels in the farming system. In
Hebron, by the 1930s, people rarely practised fallowing. Mr.
Phalatse recalls that it was common for a farmer to intercrop a
field crop (e.g., maize or sorghum) with a ground crop (e.g.,
watermelons, pumpkins or beans), and if the yield of a field was
acceptable in one year, the farmer would plant the same crop in
the same field the next year. If the yield declined, he would
switch the crop mix.17 Mr. Mogotsi, on the other hand, recal1s
that intercropping was not practised at Mokolokoe.'B
Similarly, cattle-keeping had become very localized. Hebron
had no "cattle posts" in the traditional sense by the 1930s; the
cattle were kept in home kraals and pastured within the boundarles
of the farm, near the village. Although the pasture areas
sometimes became overgrazed, cattle owners could rely to some
extent on grazing their cattle in the harvested fields during the
winter.l9
Both the agricultural system and the land tenure system
suggest that these communities experienced land shortage.
Indeed, when the Bakwena community that would become the
Ga-Magopa, or Ventersdorp, section of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa were
living in the Free State, and approached Chief J.O.M. Mamogale
for assistance in moving to the Transvaal, he promised to help
them buy a farm, but one elderly informant recal1ed that he
informed them that "Bethanie is too small even for us."20
The conditions of land shortage and an internal freehold
system made conflicts over land potentially especially devisive.
1a
 Interview notes, Mr. L. Phalatse, Hebron, 21 January 1989;
Mr. Mogotsi, Mokolokoe. In Mathopestad, the process of individua-
tion of tenure went even further. According to Mr. Abie Rankoko,
only the heirs of the original purchasors of their farm could get
arable land. Others could hire land from the fami 1ies of the
purchasors. Interview, Mr. Abie Rankoko, Mathopestad, 28 May 1988.
1
 * See I. Schapera, Native Land Tenure In the Bechuanaland
Protectorate (Cape Town: Lovedale Press, 1943), p. 117-137,
143-154.
17
 Interview notes, Mr. Phalatse, Hebron, 21 January 1989.
18
 Interview, Mr. Mogotsi, Mokolokoe.
** Interview notes, Mr. Phalatse, Hebron, 21 January 1989.
30
 Theti Matsetela, Rural Change among Afrleans in the
Ventersdorp District of 1910-1935 - A Case Study of
Bakwena-ba-Mokgopa (M.A. Thesis, University of London, 1981), p.
10.
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From the late 1910s, moreover, these communities experienced
pressure on the land both from within -- from their own
missionaries -- and from wi thout, especially after passage of the
Natives Land Act.
Many Hermansburg missionaries had themselves experienced land
pressure before arriving in South Africa, and were eager not to be
pushed off of farms again. In the mid 1980s, about 70% of
Hermansburg miss ionaries had farming backgrounds in Germany, but
only about ha If of these had actual ly been "real farmer's sons."21
The remainder had been recruited from amongst the rural poor, who
had been marginalized during mechanization, in the last decades of
the 19th century, of parts of the German countryside. Of the ha 1f
of Hermansburg missionaries who were "real farmer's sons," most
would not have been able to inherit land from their fathers
because of inheritance practices in their home districts of rural
Germany. Once in South Africa, these missionaries seized on
secure rights to farm land as the central "basis for a decent
social position."22 Hence, for example, in Hebron in 1895, Rev.
Kai ser, acquired a number of servitudes securing his access to
land and labour, with respect to farms he had helped the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa purchase, or which he jointly purchased with the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa, in 1873.23
The Hermansburg missionaries valued farming not for mere
retrospective or nostalgic reasons, however. Hermansburg
missionaries were quite severely underpaid compared.to
missionaries of other societies and local teachers. They had to
practice farming or some other occupation to support themselves.
Income from farming had become "indispensable" for Hermansburg
missionaries by the 1890s. After the Boer War, some missionaries
became quite prosperous farmers: large fruit orchards were said to
be "characteristic" of their missions,a4 and Mr. Phalatse recal1s
-that Rev. Kaiser was an excellent farmer, was a member of a
(white) agricultural cooperative, and had large fields and huge
herds of pigs. 2 3
In order to operate their farms, the missionaries re 1 led
both on the labour of members of mission station communi ty, and on
the labour of communities with more tenuous or ambiguous ties to
the station. "Confirmation regiments" had replaced the chief's
circumcision regiments in the Bakwena villages when the chief had
J x
 Fritz Hasselhorn, "Mission, Land Ownership and Settlers'
Ideology, Exemplified by the German Hermannsburg Mission in South
Africa," unpublished mimeograph paper, p. 20. The paper has since
been pub 1i shed in pamphlet form by the South African Counci1 of
Churches.
2 2
 Ibid., p. 20.
2 3
 See contract dated 19 June 1907, between Heinrech Kaiser
and J.O.M. Mamogale, LD 17A2, file AG1351/09.
2 4
 Hasselhorn, p. 22-24.
2 3
 Interview notes, Mr. Phalatse, Hebron, 21 January 1989.
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abo1ished circumcisi on, and confirmation candidates sometimes
worked as unpaid farm workers for the missionaries. In Jericho,
the mission had purchased land for the Bakwena-ba-Magopa on
the condition that the community provide labour to the
missionary.2* In Hebron, however, Rev. Kaiser relied on the
labour of relative outsiders to the Bakwena-ba-Magopa community:
Rev. Kaiser employed several Bakgatla fami1ies as swineherds and
farm workers or tenants, and Rev, Behrens on at least one occasion
in correspondence to the Department refered to these Bakgatla as
"indentured" to Rev. Kaiser.37
The conflict at Hebron -- the BaMoruIa's oppostion to Chief
J.O.M. Mamogale -- probably did not have its origin solely in the
BaMorula's concerns about being liable for debts incurred to buy
"tribal land" for Bethanie and Jericho, nor in the onerousness of
the tribal levy, as the Native Affairs Department believed and one
subsequent writer have suggested. The Levy had barely been
collected from the date it was adopted in 1927 until the early
1930s, after the BaMorula opposition had become quite intense. It
is unlikely that the BaMorula protested solely over a Levy that
the Chief rarely attempted to collect and which the BaMorula
publicly refused to pay effectively without of sanction. The
conflict at Hebron probably had its origins in the dispossession
of certain members of the BaMorula in the 1910s. While a full
treatment of the nature of the conflict at Hebron is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is necessary to sketch its basic
out 1ine.2a
Mr. Phalatse of Hebron recalls that the source of the
BaMorula*s dissatisfaction was a land transaction in which Chief
Mamogale "sold" land belonging to several prominent men without
thei r consent.a * His recollection contrasts sharply with the
explanation of the Native Affairs Department30 and which was
stated formally in the BaMorula lawsuit against Chief Mamogale,
Rathebe v. Reid and Mamogale31 -- that is, that the BaMorula were
refusing to pay debts incurred in the purchase of farms for
Jericho and Bethanie, and refused to recognize sub-chief Abram
Mamogale. Mr. Phalatse is quite certain of his interpretation
because the BaMorula eventuaMy bought back the land they had
lost, and he clubbed together with them.32 There are also
24
 Breutz, p. 95. Hasselhorn, p. 22.
27
 Levy Report for November 1933. NTS 1383, file 44/213
part 2.
a
 • For an extended discussion, based on the assumption that
the oppostion was about prospective liability for "tribal" debts,
see Simpson, Peasants and Politics, chapter 5.
29
 Interview notes, Mr. Phalatse, 21 January 1989.
3 0
 See generally NTS 331, file 56/55.
31
 Rathebe v. Reid and Mamogale. TPD 5/235, case 21/1926.
32
 Mr. Phalatse, interview notes, 21 January 1989.
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scattered references in the Native Affairs Department files to
opposition by members of the BaMorula on the basis of tosses,
rather than on the basis of the Levy or prospective indebtedness.
The original conflict in Hebron was many-sided, and appears
to have had its roots in events long before the 1920s and 1930s,
when the conflict became visible to the Native Affairs Department
as the BaMorula's opposition to subchief Abram and to "tribal"
land purchases. Court records suggest that the BaMorula
dissension of the 1920s and 1930s was rooted in conflicts over
lands near the Hebron mission as early as 1910. Several important
families of the Hebron settlement, including the Ntuane family,
probably lost access to tracts of land on the farms
Sjambokzynkraa1 and Kameelfontein because of legal transactions
that took place between 1910 and 1924, and apparently, in the
1920s and 1930s, some members of these families blamed the
Hermansburg Mission or Chief Mamogale or both for their losses.
A four-way legal conflict in Hebron in the first decade of
the 1900s over the farms Kameelfontein and Sjambokzynkraal --
involving mission, paramount chief, several leading families of
Hebron and the Bakgatla -- was probably a source, if not the
main source of the BaMorula dissatisfaction of the 1930s. The
claims of a Bakgatla community, who had lived on the farm before
it was purchased by Rev. Kaiser and the Bakwena-ba-Magopa from
Barend Engelbrecht in 1873, were the first to be eroded. Rev.
Kaiser sued their chief, Sjambok, for ejectment in 1905. In the
trial for the 1 awsuit, Rev. Kaiser denied that the Bakgatla had
contributed any cattle towards the farm's purchase price. He
recalled that he had not even known that there were Bakgatla
kraals on the farms Sjamboksynkraal and Kameelfontein when he
helped purchase them. He recalled that he had contributed«*-150,
and that 26 leading men of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa -- including Levi
-Ntuane' s father -- had contributed another £.150, to the down
payment.S3 Chief Mamogale shortly thereafter contributed <£$0,
collected from the larger Bakwena-ba-Magopa community.34 Once
Rev. Kaiser discovered these carried-over Bakgatla tenants of the
Engelbrechts, he required that they pay rent in cattle. After the
Boer War, however, they refused to continue paying rent. Now,
Rev. Kaiser sought damages in the form of back rent, or ejectment.
Sjambok* s attorneys, on the other hand, argued that their "rent"
payments had been part of the purchase price, just as the cattle
payments of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa familes had been.38 Rev. Kaiser
won the lawsuit. Some of the Bakgatla families surrendered their
33
 See Hermansburg Mission Society v. Sjambok and Others,
ZTPD 5/593, case 179/1905.
3 4
 Hermansburg Mission Society v. Sjambok, evidence. See
also, Petition, In Re Hermansburg Mission Society v. Minister of
Native Affairs and J.O.M. Mamogale and Others. LD 1742, file AG
1351/09.
33
 Their attorney argued in the alternative, that the
Bakgatla had acquired freehold rights by prescription against the
Hermansburg Miss ion Society and the Bakwena-ba-Magopa. Defendant's
Plea, Hermansburg Mission Society v. Sjambok and Others.
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freehold claims to the land for some form of tenancy in order to
obtain land for ploughing and grazing, and became Rev. Kaiser* s
servants.s 6
In 1910, the Rev. Kaiser and the Hermansburg Mission sued
chief J.O.M. Mamogale, whose predecessor, Danie1 More (I) 3 7 had,
ironically, been formally joined with the Mission as co-plaintiff
against Sjaambok.3 a Rev. Kaiser now sought to enforce, against
the Bakwena-ba-Magopa, his servitudes over the farms.
Rev. Kaiser relied on a contract dated October 1907 that
provided that J.O.M. Mamogale confirmed and amplified certain
servitudes granted by his late father Jacobus in October 1895 to
Rev. Kaiser over Kamee1fontein and Sjambokzynkraal. Inasmuch as
the contract of 1907 was redundant with respect to the agreements
of 1895, Rev. Kaiser probably asked the newly-installed, young
paramount chief to enter into it In order to secure his 1egal
commitment to understandings that he, the missionary, had had with
Mamogale1s father! the date of the contract of 1907 was just
eight months after Mamogale's Installation. With respect to
Kamee1fontein, a farm of 1100 morgen, Mamogale granted to Rev.
Kai ser and his successors about 11 morgen of land and 1/3 of all
the water on the farm. With respect to both Kamee1fontein and
SJambozynkraa1 (a farm of some 3100 morgen), Mamogale granted free
grazing for Rev. Kaiser's stock across the whole of both farms;
woodcutting across both farms; and sufficient ground for five
fami1ies (presumably the Bakgatla) on each of the farms. Chief
Mamogale was also to acknowledge that by virtue of Rev. Kaiser's
contributions to the purchase prices of Kamee1fontein,
Sjambokzynkraal and Cyferfontein, the missionary possessed small
undivided interests in these farms.39 Finally, the parties agreed
not to divide the properties. Within a few years, Chief Mamogale
34
 The evidence is not completely clear as to whether these
Bakgatla were Rev. Kaiser's servants or whether they were evicted,
and some other Bakgatla group were Rev. Kaiser's servants. Mr.
Phalatse recalls that the Bakgatla people who worked for Rev.
Kaiser in the 1920s and 1930s had been on Hebron lands before the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa and Hermansburg Society bought the-farms. This
suggests that Rev. Kaiser's Bakgatla servants were, Indeed,
members of the community Rev. Kaiser had sued in 1905.
37
 There were two Daniel More's active in local affairs in
the 1930s. Daniel More (I) had been regent (1903-1906). Daniel
More (II) was younger. Breutz, p. 93.
3 9
 Danie1 More seems to have taken no active part in the
litigation. See Evidence, Hermansburg Mission Society v. Sjambok.
39
 The documents states that Rev. Kaiser contributed 6
towards the £ 1000 purchase price of portions of Kameelfontein and
Sjambokzynkraal, and ^ 4.10 towards the <^100 purchase price of
Cyferfontein, and hence had a 6/1000 and 4/100 undivided interest
in these properties. 1 suspect that the Bakwena-ba-Magopa
eventually reimbursed Rev. Kaiser for his contribution of jJlSO,
roughly ha If, of the down payment on the two farms Kamee1fontein
and Sjambokzynkraal.
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ceased observing the servitudes, and Rev. Kaiser initiated his
Iawsui t.
Although Chief Mamogale's lawyers won a legal skirmish in
the Transvaal Provincial Divis ion of the Supreme Court in
September 1910 (the court refused to recognise the validity of
the contract of 1907 on fairly technical grounds 4 0), it appears
that both parties recognised that the Mission would able to
enforce the earlier underlying servitudes of 1895.4I Although the
actual acreage conveyed by the servitudes (11 morgen) was small,
the rights over the undivided farms appear to have been so onerous
that in December 1910, shortly after loosing the skirmish, the
Society offered Mamogale a settlement of one half of the farms
Kameelfontein and Sjambokzynkraa1, divided; and it seems that
Mamogale accepted, or was forced to accept, this settlement or one
substantially like it. 4 2 In other words, to Chief Mamogale,
extinguishing Rev. Kaiser's rights to grazing, wood and water over
the whole farms may have been worth surrendering half or more of
the divided farms to the Mission.
Whatever settlement was worked out, however, does not seem
to have taken account of the claims of the twenty-six leading
fami lies whose members had paid a dispropotionate share --^150
-- of the down payment on Kameelfontein and Sjambokzynkral. They
filed a petition to intervene, seeking transfer of ha If of
Kamee1fontein and Sjambokzynkraa1 to themselves as twenty-six
individuals or their heirs and successors.41 Chief Mamogale chose
4 0
 The Court found that the contract had not been approved
by the Executive Counci1, as required by sec. 3, Law 3 of 1898.
Hermansburg Mission v. The Minister for Native Affairs and
Others. 1910 TPD 832. (The case was fully captioned, Hermansburg
Mission Society v. Minister for Native Affairs, J.O.M. Mamogale
and Others.) See also LD 1742, file AG 1351.
4 1
 Letter, Messrs. Stegman and Roos (counse1 for the
Hermansburg Mission Society, to Messrs. Pienaar & Marais (counsel
for the Native Affairs Department), stating that their clients are
prepared to "fall back upon the Agreements of the 2nd and 4th
October 1895" despite the Court's decision that the contract of
1907 was invalid. See also letter, Messrs. Stegman & Roos to
Messrs. Pienaar & Marais, 6 December 1910 (conveying an offer of
settlement). LD 1742, file AG 1351/09.
4 2
 I have come to this conclusion by reading the settlement
offer, Messrs. Stegman & Roos to Messr, Pienaar & Marais, 6
December 1910, LD 1742, file AG 1351/09, with a memorandum,
Godley to the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape
Town, 29 February 1924, p.2, NTS 325, file 37/55. The memo of
1924 discusses, inter alia, the proposed transfer after "fifteen
years" of litigation, of ha If of Kameelfontein, three quarters of
Sjambokzynkraal and all of both Cyferfontein and Oskraal from the
Hermansburg Mission Society to the Bakwena-ba-Magopa.
4 3
 The Petition states that the entire purchase price was
JL300 -- XlSO provided by them and £l50 provided by Rev. Kaiser.
Hence it contradicts the Contract of 1907.
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not to try to prevent the twenty-six from gaining title to the
land by opposing their application,44 but the twenty-six did not
win their suit.45 Under a settlement or during the course of
1itigat ion, the Society retained title to most of the farms until
1924, when the Native Affairs Department proposed to transfer the
farms back to the Bakwena-ba-Magopa, rather than to the twenty-six
who had paid half of the down payment; they appear to have lost
thei r access to these tracts of land in the interim. Levi Ntuane,
the leader of the Hebron BaMorula rebels in the late 1920s and
1930s, was the legal heir of one of the twenty-six purchasers in
1905. Although he did not to participate in the petition, at some
point he appears to have become very angry at Mamogale for his
losses. In opposing the Levy and "tribal** land purchases in the
1920s and 1930s, therefore, Ntuane and the BaMorula appeared to
disputing their obligation to pay for land that would be used by
other settlements; but the driving force beneath that conflict was
an older one, in which Ntuane was protesting the other tribal
sections* failure -- and the Chief's failure -- to assist him in
protecting his interests during a conflict with the missionary
in an earlier period. Hence Ntuane* s conf1ict had very strong
anti-Hermansburg overtones, and he founded a "Bakwena Church" at
the same time that he protested Chief Mamogale's governance.
Pressures from outside the mission and Bakwena community
forced Chief Mamogale to disposses, or acquiesce in the
dispossession of, families in his home village, Bethanie, from
some of the area's best farm lands. Yet these dispossessions
seem not to have created the sort of counter-orthodox opposition
that were generated in Hebron. The Western Transvaal Natives Land
Committee of 1918 -- charged with continuing, on a local level,
the investigations into "native" and European land tenure of the
Beaumont Commission -- refused to recommend several sections of
"the Bethanie farms, bordering on the Crocodile River, for
inclusion in the scheduled native areas. After hearing a string
of local farmers state that the "natives" should not be given
land capable of irrigation, the Committee concluded that the
Bethanie area -- recent 1y dispossessed (probably around the time
between the hearings or the writing of the report) of its land on
the Crocodile River by the Hartebeestpoort Irrigation Scheme --
was "very suitable for native occupation ... The exchange ...
Cof river front land for other land] has given every satisfaction
to the natives here, and further comment as to the suitabi1i ty is,
4 4
 Handwr itten memorandum, probably from a legal staff member
to the Acting Secretary for Justice, 6 October 1910, LD1742, file
AG 1351/09.
43
 It is not clear from the record whether it was Rev.
Kaiser or the Minister for Native Affairs who successfully
opposed them.
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therefore, unnecessary."4 * Hence, in an area where scarcity of
surface water was the major drawback to peasant agriculture and
cattle keeping, the Government's policy of segregation and its
discriminatory provision of access to irrigation, forced the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa westward, from the borders of their old
properties, away from the Crocodile River. The only other source
of surface water in Bethanie was a small spruit running through
the center of the vi1lagei but Rev. Behrens had claimed that
portion of land as early as 1905, probably on the basis of his
having been the first person to settle in the area.
These dispossessions in the years just before 1920
radicalized Chief Mamogale at least on the issue of land, and he
appears to have embarked on a land buying regimen, albeit, now
within the confines of the scheduled native areas.4 7
44
 Union of South Africa, Natives Land Committee, Western
Transvaal, Report (Pretoria: 1918), p. 9, 15-22. The land
expropriated was used for the Rooikoppies Dam irrigated lands.
47
 See Simpson, p. 177-183. The Native Lands Act remained a
target of chiefly and commoner discontent. For example, around
1917, the 1ocal press, white farmers and police informers were all
contributing to a "scare" concerning a native uprising. Pot ice
informants alleged that Chief Mamogale and most of the other
chiefs of the Rustenburg District were participating in meetings
of the Transvaal Native Congress in the area, and that chiefs,
"educated" "town" natives and Transvaal Congress off ice bearers
were inflaming African opinion toward rebel 1 ion; their main
grievance was the Natives Land Act of 1913. Ibid.. p. 180-182.
.Simpson concludes that the "evidence strongly suggests" that the
link between the chiefs and the Congress were short and tenuous
and that the chiefs were simply "land-hungry" and "concerned at
the threat to their power to purchase and distribute land."
Ibid., p. 183. Mamogale's experiences between 1905 and 1920
suggest, on the contrary, that if he was participating in the
agitation, he was responding to quite serious losses of access to
resources a 1 ready experienced by members of his community, and not
that he was seeking land to bolster his political "power" through
patronage. The agitation culminated with, inter alia. an
interview between General Both and Chief Mamogale. A partial
transcript, consisting of barely legible notes, was made of the
meeting. Although much of the meeting is lost, it does seem to
indicate that the press reports of the following day were a
"white-wash" of a fairly serious debate. General Botha accused
Mamogale of being involved in a passive resistance campaign, and
of refusing to see a certain committee (probably either the
Western Transvaa1 Natives Land Committee, before which Mamogale
did not testify). Mamogale protested against the passage of the
Natives Land Act during the war, and moreover insisted that
General Botha identify police informers within the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa community. Rough notes, possible dated 16
August 1918 for filing purposes, NTS 323, file 26/55. See, on the
other hand, Simpson, p. 182, suggesting that during the interview,
Mamogale laughed with Botha about the idea of the natives planning
a rebe1 lion.
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These land purchases ultimately caused as much contention as
the land dispossessions. First, when Chief Mamogale embarked on
these land purchases, the market of sellers was severely
restricted by the Natives Land Act, and land prices (to Afr icans)
soared. Secondly, he did not anticipate the problems of
transacting business with the wily Engelbrecht clan, who defrauded
the chief out of some ^2000 down payment on the farm
Elandsfontein.48 Finally, Chief Mamogale never effectively
collected the Levy, which was adopted in 1922 and revised in 1927
to pay for the land; indeed he did not pay his Levy arrears unti1
1937.4* The debt grew with interest out of reach of "tribal"
finances, and by the mid 1920s, but the chieftainship's annual
mortgage commitments far outstripped the funds being collected
from levy receipts, the rent on trading sites and the sale of
prospecting rights. A detailed accounting of the chieftainship's
finances between 1926 and 1932 shows that the funds were being
administered by and large properly.90 Yet the seeming endless pit
of debt for which levy was being collected began causing
dissension within the community. Many of the more humble members
of the tribe seem to have had little understanding of what the
levy was for;31 while more prominent members were beginning to
suspect that the chief was embezzling funds. In 1929, the Native
Affairs Department took the Levy completely out of Mamogale's
hands after he admitted misappropriating Ji 168.S2 In June 1931,
the Department assumed the private mortgages totalling some
JCl3,674 through a 1oan from the Native Development Account,
leaving only one private loan mortgage of £2500, but this did not
improve the Bakwena-ba-Magopa's financial position.flS
By the early 1930s, therefore, the Native Affairs Department
Development Account held huge bonds over the Bakwena-ba-Magopa's
farms, and it seemed quite unlikely that they would be able to pay
them off. The Department was thus in a delimmat If officials
foreclosed on the farms, they would undoubted 1y cause civil
strife, perhaps law suits that would establish unfavourable
precedents, and would detribalize one of the "largest" and most
48
 Godley to office of the Secretary for Native Affairs, 29
February 1924, NTS 325 37/55. The Engelbrecht family, which was
active in selling land to Africans, may also ave defrauded the
Bapo, Just south of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa at Bethanie. See
Mogale v. Engelbrecht, 1907 TS 236, case 152/1907.
49
 Levy Report for March 1937. NTS 1383, file 44/213 part
3.
90
 Lands Branch memorandum, Native Affairs Department, 1
July 1932. NTS 1383, file 44/213, part 2.
31
 Interview, Mr. Mogotse, Mokolokoe
S3
 See Additional Native Commissioner to Secretary for
Native Affairs, 22 May 1929, NTS 1392, file 44/213, part 1.
33
 Native Commissioner, Rustenburg to A.L. Barret, Secretary
for Native Affairs, 26 June 1931, NTS 1383, file 44/213 part 2.
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important" tribes of the TransvaaI.34 If they did not foreclose
and sell the farms, the development account would be out of pocket
several thousand pounds and the Department would establish the
undesirable principle that it would bail out and ultimately
provide grants to tribes overcommi tted with debts. Given the
Department* s dilemma, a stalemate -- the Bakwena-ba-Magopa paying
just enough to keep up with interests, while not retiring any
capital -- could have dragged on for decades.
Rev. Behrens, however, stepped into this refractory
situation. He offered to use his "expertise and influence,
derived from forty years among the Bakwena," to help them collect
the levy and pay off their land debt.33 And much of the hope,
conflict and ultimate strife that surrounded the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa1s debts, from 1932 to the riot of 1940, would
revolve around the "reverend gentleman" of Brits.
III. The Levy
During his years as Collector of the Levy, Rev. Behrens
worked with three different kinds of social networks. First, he
organised what he called "commissions" in the three home villages,
their outlying hamlets, and Pretoria and the Rand. The
commissions were committees organised to collect the levy both in
the rural villages and in the labour centres of Johannesburg,
Pretoria, Brits and the East Rand. Next, Rev. Behrens tried to
organise the headmen of the rural villages to assist in collecting
the Levy. The headmen were mostly male elders of the 1ineages or
clans in each village. As some of the commissions began splitting
along kinship lines -- like the Bakwena-ba-Magopa community in
general and Hebron in particular -- Rev. Behrens concluded that he
needed the assistance of the now most effective figures in the
villages, the heads of the clans. The lineages, however, were at
least partly responsive to popular pressures, and their members in
both town and country became increasingly disturbed by Rev.
Behrens's tactics between 1934 and 1940 in collecting the Levy:
That is, he frequently relied upon police raids to pursuade peop1e
to pay Levy. Hence after a short period of cooperation, the
headmen began refusing to assist Rev. Behrens.
3 4
 The Department would have had difficulty selling the farms
in execution of the mortgage bonds because of the Natives Land
Act, No. 27 of 1913. No "European" would have been able to
purchase the farms at auction because the farms were scheduled
under the Act as within the Native area. And, if the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa had been unable to collect a levy to pay the
debt, few other chieftainships in the area were capable either.
The Department's only option would have been selling the farms to
individual Afr icans, which, again, would have run counter to the
policy of checking the detribalisation of the rural areas.
3 3
 Behrens to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 June 1931,
NTS 1383, file 44/213 part 2.
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Finally, Rev. Behrens turned to a counter-orthodox network
headed by himself and Daniel More (II). Within Bethanie, Daniel
was an ambi guous figure. He represented "heathen" claims to
leadership of the chieftainship which some prominent people of
Bethanie found offensive. He also had friends in Johannesburg
who helped him collect the Levy there, and this network of
tax-farmers3* was very effective on the Rand. But when Daniel
moved to Bethanie in early 1940, as the Rev. Behrens's and Native
Affairs Department's clear choice to succeed J.0.M. Mamogale,
whom the Department had deposed, several "orthodox" networks,
which had been divided or dormant, became active, in opposition
to what was perceived to be a "counter-orthodox" assault on
the community. The counter-orthodox associations of Danie1f s
network included heathenism, violence and the police. Ultimately,
"German-ness," and by association, the Hermansburg Lutheran
Church, became symbolically attached to this counter-orthodoxy,
and, the world turned upside-down, the Bakwena-ba-Magopa rioted in
the old Lutheran Church in the center of Bethanie.
Rev. Behrens3 7 became especially interested in the progress
of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa Levy late in 1931, and especially about
their indebtedness, and in February 1932, he offered to the
Department his services as the "Collector of the Tribal Levy."
He believed that neither the Chief, nor the local Native
Commissioners were particularly interested in co Meeting the levy
more r igorously so that the Bakwena-ba-Magopa could begin retiring
thei r capita 1 debt and escape what threatened to become endless
interest payments. He reasoned that with stronger enforcement
and better-informed, more willing levy-payors, the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa could retire their mortgage bonds in a few
5 4
 Tax-farming is the practice whereby a government collects a
tax by all owing a number of non-offIcials or semi-officials to
collect it on its behalf, In exchange for a commission, that is,
a percentage of the tax revenues.
3 7
 Rev. Behrens had been involved in the issues of land
purchases and Levy collections throughout the 1920s, as an
unofficial adivsor to the Native Affairs Department and as a
sometime intermediary between the Department and the
Bakwena-ba-Magopa community. I do not understand why Rev.
Behrens became so interested in the Levy at this point. One
possibility is that as an retired missionary living in Brits, he
sought some position that would help him become active once again
in the community within which he had lived almost his entire life.
Another possibility is that he needed a job, Hermansburg
missionaries had not been well-paid, and as a retiree, he may have
had little income during a period of economic depression. A third
possibility is that he had, or sought, some interest in land near
Bethanie; in his monthly reports he sometimes suggested that he
was not just interested in the Bakwena-ba-Magopa paying off their
debts but in helping them purchase neighboring farms that had
been re 1 eased under the Natives Land Act.
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years.aa As between force and enlightenment, Rev, Behrens tended
to focus on the former, especially on schemes for getting direct
garnishment of levy defaulters* income or property; but he never
lost faith that any Mokwena who understood the tribal debt would
want to pay i t, and that those who did not were purposely not
assuming their rightful share of the burden. Thus much of his
work during the next eight years involved trying pursuading the
Bakwena to organise to pay the levy, on the one hand, and
compiling lists of people to report to Native Commissioners for
nonpayment, on the other. Even as he offered his services he had
decided on these two tactics:
I know that when any person in a village gets an inkling of
the approach of the police [collecting taxes or levy], he
spreads the news, and all those in default hide or quickly
leave the vi1lage on the other side, and connot thus be
apprehended... If the Bakuena are expected to bring the
levy to the [Native Commissioner] I believe not half of them
will do so unless some force is brought to bear on them and
even then in intervaIs of one and two years.
I am prepared to hold mass meetings, make up all necessary
1 ists, appoint competent and reliable assistants at various
places with the approval of the local tribal sections, and
begin to collect small and large contributions under
continual personal supervision... My chief object is firstly
to create a wi11 ing community, fully understanding the
position, and very ready for cowork, wherever they may be. 3 •
Exceptionally uneven col lection of the Levy had, indeed, been
-a major obstacle to retiring the debt. As soon as he was
appointed, and had obtained information on Levy payments for the
last several years, Rev. Behrens began drawing up lists of past
payors and non-payors, and caculating the theoretical potiential
of the Levy for revenue. He found that of nearly 4,000 potential
levy-payors, some 2700 had never paid the levy. About 1100 had
paid something, but very few had paid their levy liability
consistently. He believed that the Levy could bring in as much
as £.6000 per year if urban workers had no choice but Lo pay --
preferably, if their wages were legally attached.*°
He was also convinced that the young people -- a majority of
whom went in search of work in the towns after finishing school in
the locations -- were the most able to pay the Levy and the most
blameworthy for not having done so. At any rate, the debt could
not be retired without them, he concluded: n 11 can impossibly be
aa
 Behrens to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 June 1931,
NTS 1383, file 44/213 part 2.
3
 * Letter, Rev. Behrens to Secretary for Native Affairs, 10
February 1932, p. 2, 5-6. NTS 1383, file 44/213, part 2.
fc0
 Levy Report for July 1932, NTS 1383, file 44/213, part 2.
See also Behrens, "Three Year Plan," 24 February 1933. Ibid.
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expected to collect the e£l500 and interest from the old people at
home! !"* >
The Native Affairs Department accepted Rev. Behrens's offer,
and appointed him Collector in April 1932, at first providing him
with a monthly salary of 2E.25. When the amount of collections
disappointed the Department, however, they pursuaded him to work
on a commission basis -- that is, 10% of levy receipts42 -- an
arrangement that added considerably more acrimony to Rev.
Behrens's relationship to the Levy defaulters and other potential
Levy payors, as the years passed.
By July 1932, Rev. Behrens had begun publicizing the land
debt in Bethanie, Hebron and Jericho, as well as amongst workers
in Johannesburg and Pretoria from the Bakwena vi1lages. He
stressed the threat of foreclosure on the farms as well as his
earlier role, as the Hermansburg missionary in the late 19th
century, in helping organize the Bethanie Bakwena-ba-Magopa
to purchase their farms. He found that once most Bakwena
understood the debt, they were "eager listeners" who were "will ing
to act," none of whom refused to pay.**
He began to organise his Levy-collecting "commissions."
Each consisted of twelve to fifteen men, elected by the larger
community in which the Levy was to be collected. No "chiefs or
subchiefs" were members;44 most of the commission members were
"workers."4S Each commission, in turn, elected a chairman,
secretary and vice-chairman. Most of the secretaries, who were
expected to keep books, issue receipts and correspond with Rev.
Behrens were teachers.44 By August, Rev. Behrens had organised
twelve commissions, and therefore had 132 men working to col 1ect
the Levy on a voluntary basis in the villages, as well as on the
Rand, in Pretoria and in Brits.47
When Rev. Behrens needed assistants for this plan, he
naturally turned to teachers to take a 1eading role as
secretaries. First, they had basic skills -- literacy and
numeracy -- that were obviously crucial to the success of such a
small bureaucratic project. Second, they were people Rev. Behrens
"trusted" and had "known for years" because almost all teachers in
Bethanie, Hebron and Jericho would have had close relationships
4 1
 Ibid.. p. 3.
4 a
 Secretary for Native Affairs to Behrens 11 May 1933, NTS
1383, file 44/213 part 2.
4 3
 Levy Report for July 1932. NTS 1383, file 44/213 part 2.
4 4
 Levy Report for July 1932. NTS 1383, file 44/213, part 2.
4 3
 Levy Report for August 1932. NTS 1383, file 44/213, part
2.
4 4
 Levy Report for July 1932.
4 7
 Levy Report for August 1932.
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with the Hermansburg Mission Church and the schools with which
they were closely associated. Third, teachers were we 11 respected
In rural communities for being "learned." Finally, teachers would
have known most of the young recent pupils who left their schools
each year in search of work in the towns, and who were an
important target of Rev. Behrens's plans.
The relationship between teachers and mission also, however,
contained tensions. Missionaries taught in their schools and
acted as superintendents. In Hebron, for example, after the
mission schools were taken over by the Transvaal provincial
education system in 1930, Rev. Denke, the Hermansburg missionary
at Hebron, remained chairman of the local schools committee, and
"chose" some of the "elected" local schools committee members like
Peter Pekane, Joseph Musi and Solomon Phalatse. Hence, even
though technically the schools were no longer under direct
mission control, Rev. Denke had tremendous authority over the
schools and their teachers. According to Mr. Phalatse, who became
a teacher in 1936, Rev. Denke insisted, that Hlf you wanted
a post in this [former] mission school, you should be prepared to
run Sunday school ... If not you are expelied from your post!"
The tension was greater for some teachers than for others because
not all teachers were Hermansburg Lutherans. A local lad who
gained an education, Mr. Phalatse was expected by his father and
Rev. Denke to become a teacher in Hebron, and he had little choice
in the matter. As a Hermansburg Lutheran and son of Hebron,
however, Mr. Phalatse liked teaching under the local missionary,
and had "all facilities, all support [and] al1 recognition."*fl
Other teachers, were 1 ess happy. Because of a lack of qualif led
teachers in Hebron and other Hermansburg mission stations,** the
schoo1 employed teachers from other denominations, including
Anglicans and Berlin Mission members. These non-Hermansburg
Lutheran Christian teachers left their posts "time and again ...
because they did not want to be converted into [the] Lutheran
church."70 As the Levy collection scheme got off the ground, Rev.
Behrens also put special pressure on village teachers to pay the
Levy, because unlike the other country people, they earned steady
wages.7 * Hence, teachers in the rural Bakwena vi1lages had close
relationships with the Geman Lutheran missionaries, but they
4 8
 Interview notes, Mr. Phalatse, Hebron, 24 January 1989.
* * Ironically, Bethanie had compu1sory education from 1870,
and people from Hebron and Jericho had access to Hermansburg
miss ion education from shortly thereafer. See Levy Report for
September, 1932, NTS 1383, file 44/213, part 2. The Hermansburg
Mission schools intitially did not teach Eng1ish or Afrikaans,
however, so few of their pupils were qualified to teach after the
Transvaal provincial takeover. See N. Mokgatle, Authobiography of
an Unknown South African (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1975, p. 78.
7 0
 Interview, Mr. Phalatse.
71
 Levy Report for February 1933. NTS 1383, file 44/213
part 2.
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experienced pressure from the missionaries with which other
vl1 lagers did not have to contend.
With the commissions beginning to work, Rev. Behrens called
a meeting of commission members for 3 October 1932, a hoiiday,
in Brits. The turnout was impressive. In the morning, commission
volunteers began arriving by foot. More arrived by donkey carts
and bicycles, and some, coming from further away, arrived by
train. The Johannesburg commission members arrived most smart 1y
in three motor cars. The Hebron delegates arrived a 1 ready divided
amongst themse1ves into BaMorula and BaTsiela factions. The
fact that the BaMorula came at all, however, indicates that,
although not enthusiastic, they were not opposed in principle to
helping the larger Bakwena-ba-Magopa community out of their
collective troubles. The forty-six delegates (about three from
each commission) met for six hours. Despite everyone's concern
about the economic depression, the meeting resolved that each
commission should try to collect a minimum of J10 each, which
would guarantee at least ©&20 per month revenue. Before
adjourning the meeting the participants also organised the
Hebronites into two commissions -- one for the BaMorula and one
for the BaTsiela. People with ties to Bethanie took the leading
role in organising a Johannesburg commission.7 2
As the meeting ended, a rain storm broke over Brits, and
several commission members were forced to seek shelter in town
for the night. Rev. Behrens believed that the season would be
"blessed with good rains" and some commission members mentioned
that rain on the day of the conference was a good omen both for
the Levy and crops.73 It was an ironic omen for both: The worst
drought in fifty years was begining, and the Levy would harvest a
large crop of bitterness for the Bakwena-ba-Magopa community.
As ploughing season approached, people in the rural villages
were already buying grain to eat, as the last two harvests had
been meagre. Cattle were already "everywhere in very poor
condition, because of the long severe drought." Unemployment was
high because of the depression and many Bakwena looked in vain for
work, especially as Batswana from the Protectorate were also
scouring the Transvaal for work. White farmers in the Brits area,
forced to cut back production as the Hartebeestpoort Dam dried up,
cut wages and reduced their labour forces; when the Brits wheat
crop was reaped, "men, women and girls flock together from all
surrounding Locations from far and near, and soon finish the
little work there is ..."7* By November, the Hartebeestpoort Dam
was empty and its canals had dried up. The Crocodile River, from
which the Bakwena-ba-Magopa had been moved in the late 1910s, came
"to dead standstill below Beestekraal." None of the residents of
72
 Levy Report for October 1932. NTS 1383, file 44/213 part
2.
73
 Levy Report for February 1933. NTS 1383, file 44/213
part 2.
74
 Levy Report for October 1932. NTS 1383, file 44/213, part
2.
- 21 -
the Bakwena-ba-Magopa locations were ploughing because of the lack
of rain. Cattle and game began dying in the veld of starvation
and thirst in November, but by December they were dropping dead
wby hundreds." Rev. Behrens had not seen a drought of this
magnitude in his 52 years in South Africa, and had not heard of a
drought like this occur ing since 1863.73 By the beginning of
1933, some Bakwena began ploughing on the merest hope of rain, but
the sun simply burned the shoots that came up. By February, Rev.
Behrens concluded that there would be no harvest whatsoever in
1933 -- "Nothing at all will be harvested and no green mealies,
pumpkins, sugarcaneC,] beans or herbs can be collected from the
fields* -- and for the next several months, as winter approached,
he begged the Native Affairs Department to provide famine relief
in the Bakwena villages. On the chance that the Department might
provide it, he began collecting statistics on food, and found that
many families had nothing to eat, and of the few who still had
catt1e, some had traded a beast for one ttbag of mealles, and a
goat for a parrafin tin of meal or Kaffircorn!"7*
By April, according to the statistics Rev. Behrens had
collected, there were full-fledged famine conditions:
From the Bethanie and Jericho returns it is evident that
these two Sections of the Tribe are 1iterally without any
foodstuffs, and also in most cases without the means to buy
any, as the men can find no work, and have no money or catt1e
to buy food with, the cattle either being too poor for want
of sufficient grazing and water, or cannot be missed, but are
wanted for future work in the gardens, if they survive the
drought. Although the famine position at Hebron cannot be
satisfactorily gauged from the returns mentioned, I
understand after general enquiries that Natives of that
Section are very much in the same plight as the other two,
and that thus the whole Bakuena ba Mogopa Tribe can be
considered as living and suffering under famine conditions
this year, and that something should soon be done, chief 1y
for the old and sick, the widows and their children.
I trust that ... some [famine] relief [from the Department]
will soon be forthcoming in some form or other.77
Rev, Behrens, who was meticulous about recording the day-to-day
events relevant to the levy in the Bakwena-ba-Magopa 1 ocations
never recorded that any famine relief was provided to the African
7 5
 Levy Report for November 1932, p. 1; Levy Report for
December 1932, p. 6. NTS 1383, file 44/213, part 2.
7
* Levy Report for March 1933, p. 1-2. NTS 1383, file
44/213, part 2. Unfor tunately, 1 have not been able to locate
Rev. Behrens statistics, which would provide a fascinating and
detailed account of family budgets.
77
 Levy Report for April 1933, p. 1-2. NTS 1383, file
44/213, part 2.
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population. In July 1933, however, the Rustenburg Platinum mines
were restarted and the 1 oca 1 famine stricken were given preference
over foreign workers.TB The Native Affairs Department also
quietly decided not to press tax-payors on the year* s hut tax, and
agreed with Rev. Behrens that he needn't try to collect the Levy
from the rural population. On 1y teachers and urban workers
amongst the Bakwena-ba-Magopa seemed to have money for food, let
alone for taxes and Levy.79
The rains came only in October 1933. By the time of the
rains for the 1933-34 crop season, oxen were so scarce and the
few alive in such poor condi tion that many women reverted to
pre-plough agriculture, using picks to plant in unploughed
land.00 During the growing season, however, the area was invaded
by swarms of locusts and birds. After two meagre seasons and one
season of famine, when "meal for porridge [was] sti 11 .•. a rare
article and dear," the Bakwena were forced to fight locusts, birds
and weeds, which threatened the crops in what otherwise would have
been an environmental\y benign year.ml
Even as the drought rendered more and more Bakwena of the
vi1lages became peniless, they remained prey to sharpsters. Rev.
Behrens found that local merchants frightened several people into
selling their savings in British silver coins for less than they
were worth, in the confusing withdrawal of British money from
South Africa, which coincided with the drought. And several white
farmers cheated local vi1 lagers into working by enter ing contracts
and refusing to pay the wages.82
Even before the drought, members of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa
community in the rural areas relied upon the wages of their town
kinsmen and kinswomen, and their dependece was radically deepened
during the famine. Urban workers had already been pressed
by demands by their kinsmen on their wages before the famine.
Now the demands increased in size as rural relatives became
destitute, in breadth as destitution spread among more and more
kinsmen, and in importance as the demands were for survival by
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kinsmen during a famine -- all at the same time when because of
the depression, wages were being cut and work was becoming more
difficult to find and less secure, in the towns.
Yet Rev. Behrens seems never to have grasped how many demands
there were on wage-earners incomes. He believed that the town
Bakwena -- "the storeboys, officeboys, kitchenboys, parce1 riders,
cabdrivers, motorcardrivers, servants houseboys, gardenboys,
laundryboys, and similarly employed Natives ... who earn from
1.2. 10 to 15 ... and more per month" -- "can easily miss 5/ to
10/- from their wages" in installment payments on their back Levy
liabilities. Yet he readily admitted that after these workers
paid their support to thei r country kinfolk, "they have not much
over."83 It was the regularity of wages -- compared to the
hazards of relying on farming -- that made him see a chimera of
finanela 1 stabllity for the Levy fund if only he could control
young workers' wages. Morever, rooted in the countryside, he did
not seem to understand the expenses faced by Africans living in
town. Writing and rewriting lists of Levy "nonpayors" and
"neverpayors" until late into the night, personally suffering lost
income on his 10% Levy commissions because of Levy defaulters, he
began to develop a stereotype of the urban worker, which, it
seems, caused him to resent them. For example, in early 1934, an
elderly rural man in tattered clothing offered to pay lOsh. toward
his Levy debt. Behrens exclaimed (in writing):
I should rather have gone with him to a store and bought him
a pair of trousers for the lOsh, instead of having to accept
this for Levy. But what could I do? I took the lOsh and
gave him his receipt, admiring his zeal and personal
disinterestedness. This Native puts to shame the many finely
clad, cigarett smoking Native "Town Gentlemen", who do not
pay their Levy, and I intend to bring this home to them at
the next Meeting in Johannesburg.84
Consequently, throughout the drought, Rev. Behrens never
ceased trying to collect the Levy from his urban Levy commissions,
although the collections were quite meagre, amounting to only
^ 3 7 7 for all of 1933. During the crop season of 1933-1934,
wage earners were under pressure to assist their rural kinsfolk
with "food and clothing" and with "hiring and paying Eurpean and
Native owners of spans of oxen and donkeys" for ploughing. Rev.
Behrens concluded that for this short period, "wage earning
Natives had many genuine excuses for avoiding to pay" the Levy.
Never the less, he began drawing up "accounts" of the amounts owed
by each potential Ievy-payor. He assumed that, despite the fact
that the Levy had not been collected regularly, every Mokwena was
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liable for all years that he had not paid since the Levy had been
instituted. In August, he sent out 300 such accounts.85
As the pressure on wage earners instensif led, the competition
between factions in the commissions also intensified. The
Johannesburg commission began disintegrating because of "jealousy"
among officers and the members ceased trusting their officers.
Meanwhile, the Hebron commission became completely split between
the BaMorula and BaTsiela factions. The Pretoria commission
became inactive after the death of its chairman, and no other
members seemed to be able to revive it.**
Rev. Behrens began to treat his Levy commissions with
increasingly high-handed behavior. He dismissed eight members of
the "elected" Rand-Bethanie commission for obstructing the work.
Two of the eight refused to cease collecting the Levy, however,
and kept careful records of their col lections which they dutiful\y
handed over to the Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg for
safekeeping.07 By early 1934, the commissions were less and less
under Rev. Behrens's control. Levi Ntuane, leader of the
BaMorula, began openly speaking out at Hebron against the Levy,
and the BaMorula Levy commission on the Rand wrote to Rev. Behrens
explaining that they could not collect the Levy without
instructions from "their Fathers" in Hebron.•• His relationship
with the Hebron BaMorula broke down, and claiming to have obtained
the consent of what remained of his commissions, Rev. Behrens
began reporting urban workers who had never paid the Levy:
He reported 180 young men from Hebron working in Johannesburg and
Pretoria to the Native Commissioner of Pretoria for prosecution
for nonpayment of Levy. In April, he reported the entire Hebron
rand commission to the Additional Native Commissioner,
Johannesburg for prosecution, and the following month did the same
for the entire Jericho commission. By August, therefore, he had
actually reported two of three Rand-vi1lage Levy commissions for
defaulting in their own Levy payments, and had called on the
Bethanie Rand commission to disband itself."*
While his urban commissions began falling apart, Rev.
Behrens turned his attention on the countryside, where he tried
to hold meetings to gain the support of village elders. As he
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presented the issue, the elders became frustrated with the
inabi1ity of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa to pay off the debts. Two
headmen, Josia More of Oskraal and Willem Mogotsi of Bultfontein
volunteered to collect the levy in their villages.'0 This
prompted Rev. Behrens to formulate a plan to have the headmen
collect the levy both in the vi1lages and in the urban areas. At
a meeting convened by Chief Mamogale to discuss the Levy,
moreover, he presented the assembled headmen, counci1lors and
subchiefs with a long "law" of the Bakwena-ba-Magopa and pursuaded
the meeting to adopt it. The main features of the law were that
headmen would extend their courts from their tradi tional capacity
-- that is, as judges in intra-linneage cases -- to fine Levy
defaulters.91 Rev. Behrens seems to have been able to rely for a
few months on latent tensions between elders and wage workers, to
gain support for the Levy in the vi1lages amongst the 1ineage
heads. But soon, the headmen began asking Rev. Behrens about his
heavy handed reliance on the police. At a meeting in Jericho
Many questions were put to me ... with regard to the Levy,
but what troubled them most, was that the [Native]
Commissioner of CHamanskraal] had sent po1 ice twice to
arrest Natives of Jericho in batches to appear before him,
charged with not paying Taxes of Levy. They wanted to know
whether this had been done at my request. I could assure
them, that I knew nothing about this ...*a
The headmen clearly objected to taking an active role in
reporting their kinsmen to the police for prosecution and would
not enforce the "melao" that Rev. Behrens had drafted. In what
looks 1 ike an attempt to mediate between Rev. Behrens and the
hundreds of Levy defaulters living in towns, Chief Mamogale, the
subchiefs and headmen asked Behrens to attend a meeting at
Bethanie on 31 May 1935 to meet with a delegation of workers from
Johannesburg. Instead of suggesting a compromise with either the
workers or the headmen, Rev. Behrens suggested to the meeting "a
radical change" in collecting the Levy in the towns. He proposed
that one full time "sub-collector" be sent to collect on the Rand.
Before the meeting, he had mentioned this plan to Chief Mamogale,
and he now asked the chief to propose the name of his subcol1ector
to the group; nevertheless, there was strong opposition. Despite
the opposition, Rev. Behrens pushed through with his plans and
hired Daniel More of Mokolokoe as his full time Levy collector.93
The appointment of Daniel More appears to have sparked
intense opposition, first from "prominent" Bakwena in Bethanie,
9 0
 Levy Report for August 1934. NTS 1383, file 44/213 part
2.
91
 Molao oa Bakwena ba Mogopa oa Levy (and Eng. tr.). NTS
1384, file 44/213 part 3.
9 2Levy Report for May 1935. NTS 1383, file 44/213 part 3.
9 3
 Levy Report for May 1935. NTS 1383, file 44/213 part 2.
- 26 -
but thereafter from former commission members, headmen, teachers
and Chief Mamogale*s closest relatives and possible liamogale,
himself. The initial opposition to Daniel was based on his
ambiguous relationship to the ruling lineage. Rev. Behrens
explained in a Levy Report,
But who is Daniel More, that so much fuss is made about his
appointment, and that he meets with opposition from certain
quarters? Old Chief Mamogale appointed his son Raikane as
his [successor] in [18743, when I was present. Chief
Raikane was secretly poisoned In 1880. His son Jakobus
More, a Christian, was proclaimed Chief in 1880. The
Heathens of the Tribe, still being strong at that time,
wanted Jakobus to take over the young wives or concubines of
his late father, according to heathen custom, as his wives.
Jakobus, as a Christian, refused, whereupon the heathen
party found a prominent heathen (Ramekoe) to accept them as
his wives.- Daniel More is the son of one of these wives by
Ramekoe, and is not considered to be of royal blood, but
still [has] some connection with the Chief's relatives.'4
Danie 1' s relationship to the chief's family was, however, more
ambi guous than Rev. Behrens characterised them. He clearly
thought of himself as having "royal blood, *• and indeed of being
fourth In succession after Chief Mamogale, Abram Mamogale and
Daniel (I) More. In testimony in the Rathebe case, he declared:
I am brother of the late chief [Jacobus] Mamogalie and uncle
of the present chief. I am a headman. I live at [Mokolokoe]
... I am second headman. The first headman is Abraham
Mamogalie... There are two Daniel Mori's. The other is a
counsellor. Abraham is twin brother of the chief. I come
fourth In the kingdom of Mamogalie... There is the chief,
then Abraham, then Daniel No. 1, then myself.98
Daniel was not only "fourth" in Mamogale1s kingdom by his
own reckoning, but by "heathen" reckoning, his claims to the
chieftainship could challenge those of Mamogale. Daniel's mother,
Mothibe, was "attached" to the Great House of Raikane. Although
she was not herself the "Great Wife", her children should have
been considered the children of the "Great Wife". If Lerothodi
had followed the prescriptions of the "heathens'*, then he would
have fathered children not by the "Great Wife" (his biological
mother), but any of the other wives. Mothibi arguably could have
borne Lerothodifs successor. (See Figures 1-3) Even though
Jacobus Lerothodi refused to father children by Mothibe, another
close relative of Raikane -- Ramekoe, for example -- could have
*
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Figure l: Ceneoloiy of BaWena Paraiount Chiefs
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Finally, DanieI seemed to carry associations of criminalIty
or unfair dealings. In some prior transactions, Behrens wrote,
Danie1 had been accused of "acts which are not quite above board.**
For example, at some point when Mamogale was sti 1 1 in charge
of the Levy, he had appointed Daniel to collect it. At the time,
Daniel was said to have commandeered cattle.101
To Daniel's credit, he had been Chief Mamogale's main
representative in negotiations with the Ventersdorp section of
the Bakwena-ba-Magopa, and had co1 leeted the purchase price for
Zwartkop successfully.102 Whatever else may have been his
faults, it could not be said that he was an inefficient collector
of money.
Daniel became a phenomenally successful Levy collector in
Johannesburg. In 1936, collections rose to £.1713 and in 1937
£l832. Moreover, wherever he went, Levy collections rose. When
he was in Bethanie or Mokolokoe for Christman vacation, Levy
co1 lections rose in those villages to unprecedented levels, and
dropped off to zero in Johannesburg. When he returned to
Johannesburg, col lections rose there and fel1 back to zero or near
zero in the villages (See Fig A). He worked with a group of men
in Johannesburg, about whom little was recorded but some is
hinted, in the Levy records; it seems that they were all working
for part of Rev. Behrens's 10% commission on collections.
When Rev. Behrens tried to hire additional sub-collectors, they
had disasterous experiences compared to Daniel's. For example,
Rev. Behrens obtained the permission of Mamogale's kgotla to
employ Johannes Komane, a former teacher and storeowner in
Pretoria. On his first day, the first worker he tried to collect
from "threatened that if he dared to come again he would break his
neck."103 He collected meagre amounts but suffered frequent
insults.104 After many tribulations, including a mysterious
.collision with a motor car while he was on bicycle, In October
1939, Komane wrote Rev. Behrens a letter containing "all sorts of
excuses, saying twice: •look for somebody else.1"109
Although Daniel managed to collect sufficient Levy receipts
for the Bakwena-ba-Magopa to begin making payments on its capital,
he also continued to prompt considerable opposition. In February
1936, a group of urban workers met in Sophiatown as a Committee
of Vision, to organise an assault by 70 men on the church bell in
Hebron. Their attack turned into a fight and several people had
to be taken to Hospital. Rev. Behrens had used the bell to summon
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people whenever he was collecting Levy in the rural villages. It
was, moreover a symbol of the Hermansburg Lutheran Church, and
Daniel 1ived next to the Hermansburg Mission1s Church in
Johannesburg.' "
In the rural villages, during the late 1930s, Rev. Behrens
was consistently "stood up" by headmen, sub-chiefs Char ley and
Aaron More and Mamogale, when he wished to discuss the Levy with
them. Chief Mamogale, who was gravely ill with heart disease by
1938, seems to have become during the period a passive resistor
of Rev. Behrens when possible. Charley, the sub-chief, went
further, protesting to Rev. Behrens that he collected "from the
* poor' who have left for the Towns to work for money, and leaving
the 'wealthy* to sit at home." He later sent Rev. Behrens a list
of 38 Hwealthy" villagers.107 Bethanie's teachers were reported
in August 1939 to be holding meetings in Johannesburg about
resisting the Levy. And a group in Bethanie, calling themselves
the Vigilance Committee, led by two Bethanie teachers, offered
to Chief Mamogale to try to instil discipline in the community,
but began to challenge the chief*s authority. The town became
divided between the adherents of the Vigilance Committee, also
called the Voortrekkers or MaVoor, and the chief's defenders,
called the MaAgter.»° •
Several events finally kindled this disparate oppostion of
teachers and urban workers into a period of violence. First, the
Native Affairs Department pursuaded Chief Mamogale, who was very
ill, to resign in favour of Daniel More as regent in October
1939.l09 Daniel arrived in Bethanie to take over the affairs of
the chieftaincy in November 1939. By early 1940, Daniel was
collecting Levy while trying to get local administration under his
contro1. In April, the crops were totally ruined by untimely
rain.
Then events in Europe seem to have a decisive if very
indirect impact on the opposition to the Levy, Daniel More, Rev.
Behrens and the Hermansburg Mission Society in the village of
Bethanie. The Allies were suffering through their lowest point of
the war: The Nazis were striking west, seemingly invincibly, and
1
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of France's fall was published in the Randthe news
The Mai 1 and the Star were almost completely dominated
during June and July of news of the war, and anti-German
propoganda. The newspapers likened the Germans to barbarians and
mad oppressors. As both German nationals and Afrikaner were
detained, the papers made a link between Fascism and the policies
of the Ossewabrandwag. Each day brought more news of German
attrocities, pro-Nazi Afrikaner fanaticism and the insidious
"Fifth Column" in South Africa. On June 15, the Mai 1 printed an
ominous piece on the necessity of German Internment:
Another matter that is occupying the attention of the
authorities is the activity of German Missionaries among the
native population. There are still 500 people engaged in
German mission work in the Union and many of these are
suspected of pro-Nazi propoganda. Many have already been
interned, and it is expected that quite a number of
additional internments among this section will shortly be
made.ll°
The normative reversal111 of the world was now complete, and
counter-orthodoxy ruled the world in Bethanie. A "heathen**
chief, who had long worked with the German missionary to collect
funds, for which no one really understood the purpose, was
the Bakwena Lutheran Church
that the church split because
sending their money overseas
Mogotsi, one of the first
Church, was surrounded, and
governing Bethanie. Mr. Masongwa,
minister in Bethanie today recalls
people were tired of the white man
to Germany.112 The home of Joseph
black ministers of the Hermansburg
his family threatened with death.113 Benches in the Lutheran
church were axed and set alight inside the church building, and
the doors and windows were smashed.'**
Two years later, the Bakwena Lutheran Church had 50 members
in Johannesburg, 103 members In Hebron, and 1002 in Cyferfontein,
where most of the headmen of Hebron lived. It had not penetrated
Bethanie, where the fight over the church took place.*ia There is
a large flourishing congregation in Bethanie today.
1 1 0
 Rand Daily Mai 1. 16 June 1940.
1 1 1
 1 would be reluctant on the basis on my interviews thus
far to ascribe too much significane to anti-German sentiment. I
offer it here as a hypothesis, while I am in the midst of field
research.
1 1 8
 Mr. Masongwa, pastor, Bakwena Lutheran Church, Bethanie.
personal communication.
1 1 3
 Interview notes, Mr. Marks Mogotsi, 12 December 1988.
Mr. Mogotsi has thus far declined to tell me any details of that night
1 1 4
 Breutz, p. 94. "Faction Fight over Church: 48 Arrested,
Rand Dally Mail. 24 July 1940.
1 1 9
 Applicatlon for church site, Bakwena Lutheran Church.
GNLB 206, file 1697/14/317.
